The protest movement that emerged around the world in the mid-1960s and reached its climax in 1968 was both a local and a global phenomenon. In each country where the post-war generation took to the streets, there were different immediate causes and different demands. And yet, facilitated by television, these apparently disparate movements imagined themselves as part of a single struggle that was encapsulated in the famous slogan “We shall fight, we will win: Paris, London, Rome, Berlin!” Comparative approaches are therefore useful in understanding 1968. However, they often focus on the similarities between protest movements and ignore the different contexts in different countries. This is particularly problematic when it comes to the West German student movement, in which the Nazi past played a special role.

Martin Klimke’s study The Other Alliance takes the protest movements in West Germany and the United States – two countries with a particularly close but complex relationship during the Cold War – as a case study of how activists in different countries shared political ideas and forms of protest and in doing so influenced and inspired each other. But unlike some other analyses, his focus on the “exact processes” by which the two movements constructed a “collective identity”. For example, Klimke begins by carefully tracing the role that Michael Vester, a West German student who spent 1961–2 studying in the US, played in drafting the Port Huron Statement, the manifesto of the American Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Vester was one of the first links between it and the West German

Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), the organization that became the motor of the West German student movement.

It was above all the Vietnam war that led to what Klimke calls a “counter-alliance” between the American and the West German organizations that shared the same initial. Vietnam galvanized the West German student movement and gave it the American anti-war movement a common cause. At the same time, the presence of US troops stationed in West Germany offered unique opportunities for experimentation with forms of direct action that were themselves borrowed from American protest movements.

The West German student leader Rudi Dutschke – who, before he was shot in April 1968, was planning attacks on US military bases – thought of the “struggle” in West Germany as a “second front” in the Vietnam war. In a particularly fascinating chapter, Klimke shows how young West Germans increasingly identified with the Black Power movement, just as they had earlier identified with national liberal movements in the Third World like the Vietcong. For example, Bernward Vesper, the son of the Nazi poet Will Vesper and husband of Gudrun Ensslin, was deeply influenced by an encounter with Stokely Carmichael in London in 1967. In identifying with African Americans – one leaflet stated that “their resistance is also our resistance” – they often ignored the huge differences between them, and, remarkably, even began to imagine that they were themselves a colonized people.

Their identification with the African American struggle also functioned as a justification for violence. From 1969 onwards, West German students set up Black Panther Solidarity Committees, which encouraged African American GLs stationed in West Germany to desert (leading, in one case, to a shootout at a US military base) and invited leading members of the Black Panthers, like Kathleen Cleaver, to speak in West Germany. Among those most fascinated by the Black Panthers was Winfried Böse, who later joined a terrorist group called Revolutionary Cells and led the Entebbe hijacking in 1976.

Drawing on documents held in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Klimke goes on to look at the response of the US government to the increasing militant student protests in West Germany. Following the événements in Paris in May 1968, the US State Department set up a “Student Unrest Study Group” to evaluate protest movements in Europe and elsewhere. At the end of that month, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told US missions around the world that the crisis in France had “potentially very serious overtones for our foreign policy interests” because student protests might “foreshadow future national policies”. The CIA director Richard Helms even presented his own remarkably perceptive and prescient report on “Restless Youth” at a cabinet meeting in September 1968.

US officials were particularly concerned about the West German student movement because of the geopolitical significance of West Germany – and in particular West Berlin – in the Cold War. However, it is interesting that while they worried about the apparent negative shift in perceptions of the US that has taken place, largely as a result of the Vietnam war, they also thought dissent might stimulate much-needed reform of West German society and therefore closely monitored but did not attempt to suppress protest. “Our policy should be to play it cool”, the US consulate in Frankfurt advised in February 1968.

What emerges from Klimke’s study is an impressively nuanced picture. He is sensitive to the ways that the meaning of shared concepts like “resistance” could have different meanings in different contexts. Identification with other peoples’ struggles could be an expression of solidarity. But it could also be a way of escaping one’s own identity, particularly for the young West Germans whose parents were responsible for Nazism.